

## Announcements and Such

- Two Songs — By Request
  - *The Smiths*: “Ask” from *Louder than Bombs*
  - Elvis Costello: “Man Out of Time” from *Imperial Bedroom*
- **Paper topics for first essay have been posted**
  - Essays are due in 2 weeks (2/20)
- Some Suggestions on the Readings:
  - Lectures usually cover all important issues in Audi
  - So, reading time might be better spent on *articles*
  - Except when I don’t get to all (Memory, Consc., *etc*)
- Today: Consciousness (I of I)

## First-Order vs Second-Order Beliefs

- So far, we’ve been talking about *first-order* beliefs about objects, events, and the like
- We also have *second-order* beliefs — beliefs about *our own* mental phenomena/life
  - I believe that I am *thinking*
  - I believe that I *have beliefs, desires*
  - I believe that I am *seeing* people now
- How do we come to have such beliefs?
- One way (the way we’re interested in here) is by *introspection* or *self-consciousness*
- We can also come to such beliefs in other ways, but that’s not our main interest today

## Kinds of Mental Properties I

- Some mental properties — like thinking — are *processes*. These unfold over time (as in a sequence of thoughts, images, *etc.*)
- Some mental properties are *static*. At any given time, I will be in a *mental state*.
- Mental imaging can thought of in both process and state terms. The “calling up” of a mental image is a process.
- But, once the image is before my mind, I can remain in a rather static mental state.
- Belief can also be thought of as a mental state. It differs from an image, since it need not be visual or in present consciousness
- Here, the *disposition* concept is important

## Kinds of Mental Properties II

- Beliefs *can* involve mental images and they *can* be occurrent in one’s consciousness
- But, they *need not* do either. First, even occurrent beliefs need not involve images
- Second, beliefs have a more *dispositional* nature than images. They need not be occurrent in one’s consciousness at all.
- Having a belief is more than simply a “consciously felt conviction”.
- Having a belief also involves being *disposed to act* in certain ways. For instance, say I believe Hilary Clinton should be president.
- Presumably, then, I would *act* in a certain way (e.g., like voting for her in the election).

## Kinds of Mental Properties III

- We have two kinds of mental properties:
  - **Occurrent** (in conscious awareness)
    - *Experiential process* properties
      - Thinking, calling-up images, etc.
    - *Experiential state* properties
      - Having a fixed, static image in mind
  - **Dispositional** (not in conscious awareness)
    - (non-occurently) Believing that *p*
    - (non-occurently) Remembering that *p*
    - [Note: dispositional mental properties don't require consciousness at all...]

## Introspection & Inner Vision I

- “Introspection” *sounds* like it describes a process of *inner seeing* or *looking inward*
- The (naive) idea is that we can *consciously attend to mental images* (whether they be *perceptual, memorial, or imaginative*)
  - When we read or listen to a story, we can be consciously aware of mental images that are neither perceptual nor memorial
- Introspection need not be labored (or even an *act* at all) — it can be *like* becoming visually aware of the presence of an object
- Even from a naive point of view, only *some* sorts of mental properties can be “seen”, while others are experienced differently

## Introspection & Inner Vision II

- Presumably, only *occurrent mental state properties* (e.g., mental images) can be “seen” in a way that is analogous to vision
- *Dispositional* properties are *not* “seen” like this, nor are *process* properties (thinking)
- I'll focus on this simple “visual” case, and consider the analogy to perception (this is the *best case* for the analogy). 2 theories:
  - Realist theory (*analogy*: “sense-datum”)
  - Adverbial theory
- Introspection differs in some important ways from perception, and the comparison with these theories makes this clear

## Realism About Objects of Introspection

- The analogue of sense-datum theory for (imagistic) introspection would be a theory that posits *second-order images*.
  - If I “see in my mind’s eye” a mental image of a green field, then I do so *via* a (2nd-order) *image of* that (1st-order) image
- These second-order images are analogous to sense-data representations *of objects*.
- What would these things be like? It seems hard to conjure one up (I either get the original image back or a *non-image thought*)
- Perhaps they exist. If so, presumably they are “more faint” than imaginational (1st-order) images (or sense/memory images)

### An Adverbial View About Introspected Objects I

- Here, the adverbial approach seems to gain in overall simplicity (over “data” theories).
- The adverbialist just speaks of agents *mentally imaging in different ways* (visually, memorially, imaginatively/introspectively)
- The adverbialist doesn’t think of these things (perception, memory, introspection) as *relations*. So, they need *no objects*.
- The adverbialist just talks about more or less vivid mental imagings of various kinds — special cases of “general mental imaging”
  - *E.g., recollectively* sensing green-fieldly vs. *visually* sensing green-fieldly, where the former is just *less vivid* than the latter

### An Adverbial View About Introspected Objects II

- Realism about perceptible objects is a reasonable view, but realism about the objects of introspection seems less so
- Mental properties such as *imaging* seem sufficient to account for and systematize our mental lives. Objects are unnecessary.
- Adverbial theory is *anti-realist* about *objects* of introspection, but it can be *realist* about *processes* like imaging
- And, introspective experiences *are* “about” things, but their subject matter is given by the *content* of introspective experience
- This does not require “separate” *objects* of introspection with *their own colors, etc.*

### Causation, Perception, and Introspection I

- Intuitively, there should be some *causal relation* that *grounds* beliefs formed by introspection (analogous to perception)
- Can the adverbial theory do justice to this intuition? The realist theory can – there is an *object* that causally grounds the belief
- The adverbial theorist can say that it is the *process* of imaging that causes the belief
- This raises questions about the relation of the salient causal relations. Are they objects, states of affairs, events, processes?
- The realist tells the same kind of story in all of these cases – *acquaintance* with an *object* is what grounds *all* experiences

### Causation, Perception, and Introspection II

- Can one have beliefs *about introspectables* that are *not grounded in* introspection?
  - Audi: Yes. His examples here aren’t very clear. Here’s one (to which we’ll return):
  - Suppose (you believe that) scientists know a certain kind of activity in a certain part of the brain correlates with “imaging blue water”. You’re in an FMRI machine, and the doctor says: “you’re imaging blue water right now”, which you come to believe *on that basis*. [say you’re anxious & ∴ *not attending to* your images]
- Note: there can even be a (indirect!) *causal connection* between your imaging and your belief that you’re imaging. And, presumably this could even be a *justified, true belief!*

### Infallibility, Omniscience, and Privileged Access I

- It has often been held that introspection is in some sense *infallible* and *omniscient*.
- Note: This does *not* imply that our beliefs *about* introspectables cannot be false (they can). It is about *introspective* beliefs.
- *Infallibility* means (roughly): If *S* believes that *p* *introspectively* (where *p* is about *S*'s *occurrent* mental state), *p* must be true.
- *Omniscience* means (roughly): If *p* asserts something (indeed, *anything*) about *S*'s *occurrent* mental state, then *S* knows *p*.
  - Note: if one assumes further that *knowledge* is (in general) *infallible*, then Omniscience *implies* infallibility (we'll return to this point, below).

### Infallibility, Omniscience, and Privileged Access II

- Infallibility & Omniscience *together* are the *strong doctrine of privileged access*.
- Descartes (and Hume) seemed to accept something like privileged access (PA).
- Note: PA does *not* rule-out "inward" counterparts of illusion & hallucination.
  - When one has an I or H experience, one needn't *believe anything* on their basis.
- But, if there are no inner objects of introspective experience, then illusions (in the standard sense) wouldn't be possible.
- If there *are* inner objects of introspection, how would *hallucination* work?

### Infallibility, Omniscience, and Privileged Access III

- How would "hallucinating" an image of a loved one differ from *just imaging them*?
- It will be, after all, an image of the same thing, and it may also be equally vivid, *etc.*
- Indeed, it would (*a fortiori*) be *qualitatively indistinguishable* from *imaging them*.
- So, it is difficult to distinguish the cases *conceptually* - unlike in perception, where there is an *uncontroversial* asymmetry.
- This is another reason to avoid the realist move of positing mental images as objects of introspection (analogous to sense-data).
- Seems like the best reason so far, to me...

### Reasons to Doubt Privileged Access I

- Omniscience seems *far* too strong, but it does seem that we must know *something* about our *occurrent* mental states.
- Even Infallibility seems too strong. Here's a strengthened "cerebroscope" example:
  - It is discovered by future science that there is a *perfect* correlation between (current) brain states and (all) *occurrent* mental phenomena.
  - Someone invents a very highly reliable "cerebroscope", and uses it on you to determine (1) you *occurrently* believe that you are *occurrently* imaging blue waters, but (2) you are *occurrently* imaging a green field.
- This would *seem* to show that even the *infallibility* part of (PA) is (possibly) false.

## Reasons to Doubt Privileged Access II

- Problem: doesn't the "cerebroscope" *depend on* the accuracy of introspective beliefs? How else would it be *calibrated*?
- Possible answer: the scope would depend on the accuracy of *some* introspective beliefs, but not necessarily the ones (*these*) that it is being used to show are mistaken.
- Moreover, *even if it did* (in some sense) depend on *these*, it might *still* be useful.
- Analogy: A mercury thermometer is used to build a gas thermometer. Later, we could use the GT to correct the MT (even if we had *thought* the MT was infallible).
- Even *restricted* infallibility seems false...

## Introspection, Justification, and Knowledge I

- While *strict* infallibility and omniscience seem to fail, weaker principles *do* hold:
- **The Self-Knowledge Principle.** Our attentively formed introspective beliefs about what is now occurring in us are *normally* true and constitute knowledge.
  - Note: our "access" to our *dispositional* mental properties is weaker (some of our beliefs may be *repressed*, self-deception is possible, *etc.*)
- *But*, our beliefs to the effect that we are now in a *dispositional* mental state (want, fear, believe, *etc.*), are *normally* justified.
- And, *normally*, when we have a mental disposition, we're *in a position to* know it.

## Introspection, Justification, and Knowledge II

- Some other epistemic principles:
  - **Attentional Epistemic Principle.** If we attentively focus introspectively on something going on in us, we know that it is going on — *under some description*.
  - **Introspective Justification Principle.** *Normally*, introspective beliefs grounded in attentive introspection are justified; and *normally*, if I attentively focus on something going on in me, I am justified in believing that it is going on in me.
- The strength of justification provided by attentive introspection is *pretty high*. But, it is still a *defeasible* kind of justification.

## Introspection, Justification, and Knowledge III

- Suppose that repeated cerebroscopic experiments reveal a systematic bias in my introspectively formed beliefs.
- This could (in principle) *defeat* the *prima facie* justification provided by even my attentive introspective experiences.
- Moreover, even if attentive introspection does not cause me to *have* a particular second-order belief, it may still provide *situational* justification for me to have it.
- Analogy: recall that perception can provide *situational justification* for a belief, even if it doesn't *give rise* to it (I see a bird fly past but I take no notice of it).

## Consciousness as a Basic Source

- Consciousness, like perception, is a *basic source* of knowledge, belief, justification.
- Indeed, *normally*, the *degree* of justification it provides is *even stronger*.
- This has led some (Descartes) to think that introspectively grounded beliefs form a *foundation* for all knowledge (Ch. 7!)
- There is virtually no limit to how much (and when) we can know by introspection. It is both an *active* and a *creative* faculty.
- Perception & Memory are *reactive*. They can't generate "willy-nilly". Trade-off: introspection can *only* ground "*internal*" knowledge. P&M can ground "*external*" K.