

# An “Evidentialist” Worry About Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism

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## 1 SOME BACKGROUND ON ARGUMENTS FOR PROBABILISM

*Probabilism* asserts that every epistemically rational agent  $S$ ’s “degrees of confidence” (a.k.a., “degrees of credence” or “credences”) should be faithfully representable *via* some *probability function*  $b$  from the set of propositions in  $S$ ’s doxastic space to the real numbers. All of the arguments for probabilism that one finds in the literature are of the following (rough-and-ready) general form:

- An agent  $S$  has a non-probabilistic degree of belief function  $b$  iff ( $\Leftrightarrow$ )  $S$  has some “bad” property  $B$  — in virtue of the fact that their credence function  $b$  has a “bad” formal property  $F$ .<sup>1</sup>

These arguments rest on *Theorems* ( $\Rightarrow$ ) and *Converse Theorems* ( $\Leftarrow$ ), which establish that  $b$  is non-probabilistic iff ( $\Leftrightarrow$ )  $b$  has some specific (“bad”) formal property  $F$ . Here are two well-known examples:

- **Dutch Book Arguments.**  $B$  is *susceptibility to sure monetary loss* (in a gambling scenario), and  $F$  is the formal role played by non-probabilistic  $b$ ’s in the Dutch Book Theorem (DBT) and its Converse.
- **Representation Theorem Arguments.**  $B$  is *having preferences that violate some (Savage-style) rational constraints* (and/or *being unrepresentable as an expected utility maximizer*), and  $F$  is the formal role played by non-probabilistic  $b$ ’s in some (Savage-style) Representation Theorem.

To the extent that we have reasons to avoid these “bad  $B$ -properties”, these arguments provide reasons not to have an incoherent credence function  $b$  — and perhaps even reasons *to* have a coherent one. But, note that these two traditional arguments for probabilism involve what might be called “pragmatic” reasons (not) to be (in)coherent. In the case of the Dutch Book argument, the “bad” property is *pragmatically* bad (to the extent that one values money). But, it is not clear whether the DBA pinpoints any *epistemic* defect of incoherent agents. The same can be said for Representation Theorem arguments, since they involve the structure of an agent’s *preferences*.

Joyce’s argument for probabilism can be cast in similar terms. That is, it can be seen as identifying a “bad property” of incoherent agents, which arises in virtue of a “bad formal property” of their credence function. However, Joyce’s argument aims to identify an *epistemic* defect shared by all (and only) incoherent agents. In the next section, we’ll give a brief primer on Joyce’s argumentative strategy. We will keep the discussion as simple and non-technical as possible, since our present worry is rather basic and fundamental.

## 2 JOYCE’S ARGUMENT FOR PROBABILISM — THE BASIC IDEAS

For present purposes, we can think of Joyce’s argument for probabilism as a variant of an older argument due to de Finetti. What de Finetti [1] showed is that if a credence function  $b$  is incoherent, then there exists a coherent function  $b'$  that is (in one precise sense) *strictly more accurate* — *in all possible worlds*.<sup>2</sup> Let’s keep things maximally simple. Consider a toy agent  $S$  whose language  $\mathcal{L}$  contains only a single atomic sentence  $P$ . We will assume that  $S$  is “logically omniscient” in the sense that they recognize all logical equivalences in  $\mathcal{L}$ . Thus,  $S$ ’s doxastic space contains only four propositions  $\{P, \sim P, \top, \perp\}$ , where  $\top$  represents an arbitrary tautological statement, and  $\perp$  represents an arbitrary contradictory statement. We will also assume that  $S$  assigns credence 1 to  $\top$  and credence 0 to  $\perp$ . Thus, the question of  $S$ ’s coherence reduces to the question of whether  $S$  credence function  $b$  satisfies the following pair of constraints:

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<sup>1</sup>This characterization of arguments for probabilism is adapted from [3].

<sup>2</sup>Strictly speaking, de Finetti did not interpret the Brier score (his favored scoring rule) as a measure of “inaccuracy”. Joyce [5, 4] was the first to give this interpretation to de Finetti’s argument. But, our objection is applicable to any argument with the *formal* structure of de Finetti’s (or Joyce’s). So, this issue of interpretation is actually inessential for our purposes here.

- $b(P) \in [0, 1]$  and  $b(\sim P) \in [0, 1]$ .
- $b(P) + b(\sim P) = 1$ .

Next, let's think about how we might "score" a credence function, in terms of its "*distance from the truth*" (or *innaccuracy*) in a possible world". For our toy agent, there are only two relevant possible worlds:  $w_1$  in which  $P$  is false, and  $w_2$  in which  $P$  is true. If we use the number 1 to "numerically represent" the truth-value true (at a world) and the number 0 to "numerically represent" the truth-value false (at a world), then we can "score" a credence function  $b$  using a *scoring rule* which is some function of (i) the values  $b$  assigns to  $P$  and  $\sim P$ , and (ii) the "numerical truth-values" of  $P$  and  $\sim P$  at the two relevant possible worlds  $w_1$  and  $w_2$ . It is standard in this context (beginning with de Finetti) to use what is called the *Brier score* (of a credence function  $b$ , at a world  $w$ ), which is the sum of squares of differences between credences and truth values. For our toy agent  $S$ , it is defined in the following way:

- The Brier score of  $b$  in  $w_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (0 - b(P))^2 + (1 - b(\sim P))^2$ .
- The Brier score of  $b$  in  $w_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (1 - b(P))^2 + (0 - b(\sim P))^2$ .

The idea behind all such scoring rules is that "distance from truth" or "inaccuracy" of a credence function  $b$  (at a world  $w$ ) is measured in terms  $b$ 's "distance (at  $w$ ) from the numerical truth-values" of the set of propositions in the agent's doxastic space. There is a rather vast literature on alternative scoring rules, but none of those controversies about how to measure "accuracy" or "verisimilitude" of a credence function will be important for present purposes. The worry we describe below will not depend on which scoring rule one adopts. So, for simplicity, we will just assume the Brier score (which is acceptable to both Joyce and de Finetti).

With these basics in mind, we can now cast Joyce's argument for probabilism in the standard "mold" from above. For Joyce, the "bad" property  $B$  that an incoherent agent succumbs to is the property of being *accuracy-dominated*. More precisely, the formal property  $F$  that underlies this "accuracy-domination" is the existence of a coherent credence function  $b'$  that has a *strictly lower Brier score* — *in every possible world*.

Unlike the traditional arguments for probabilism, Joyce thinks of his argument as *non-pragmatic*. This is because he thinks of "accuracy" as a *purely epistemic aim*, and he thinks of the Brier score as an adequate measure of "inaccuracy". Thus, if there exists a credence function  $b'$  with a lower Brier score (hence, lower "inaccuracy") than yours ( $b$ ) — in every possible world — then this is supposed to reveal an *epistemic defect* of your credence function  $b$ . Moreover, because Joyce's theorem yields a *specific* (set of) dominating coherent credence function(s)  $b'$ , it can be seen as providing the incoherent agent with more *specific* "advice" than merely "Be Coherent!". Joyce's theorem reveals to an incoherent agent some *specific* coherent functions  $b'$  that should "look *epistemically better*" to him than his current  $b$ . Traditional arguments for probabilism do no such thing.<sup>3</sup> This seems to make Joyce's (or de Finetti's) argument "more informative" than traditional arguments. As we'll see shortly, this "additional informativeness" of Joyce's approach may not come for free (*i.e.*, it seems to open Joyce's argument up to some novel objections, not faced by traditional arguments).

### 3 THE WORRY — CONFLICTS WITH EVIDENTIAL NORMS FOR CREDENCES

Suppose an agent  $S$  is trying to figure out which candidate credence functions to *rule out*. In this process,  $S$  might appeal to various sorts of norms and considerations. For instance,  $S$  might want to rule out credence functions that are susceptible to a Dutch Book (DB). Moreover,  $S$  might want to avoid credence functions that violate the Principal Principle [7] (PP), given her current knowledge concerning objective chance.

(PP) If  $S$  knows that the objective chance of  $p$  is  $r$ , and  $S$  has no inadmissible evidence regarding  $p$ , then  $S$  should assign credence  $r$  to  $p$ .

Suppose (1)  $S$  rules out those credence functions that are susceptible to Dutch Book (DB), and then (2)  $S$  rules out those credence functions that violate (PP) given her current knowledge  $K$  concerning objective

<sup>3</sup>For instance, the Dutch Book argument only implies that you'd be (pragmatically) "better off" if you were coherent *rather than incoherent*. It doesn't single out any *specific set* of coherent functions (among the totality of such functions) that should "look (pragmatically) better" to you. As far as the Dutch Book argument is concerned, if you're incoherent then *all* coherent functions should "look (pragmatically) better" to you — and to precisely the same extent.

chance. This two-step procedure will rule out the same set of credence functions as the procedure which performs (2) first, and then (1). Specifically, no non-probabilistic  $b$ 's will survive either two-step ruling out procedure. In this sense, *the order in which the two norms (DB) and (PP) are applied does not matter*.

Interestingly, this order-independence property is *violated* by “accuracy-dominance” (AD) norms like de Finetti’s and Joyce’s (as well as other “scoring-rule-based” dominance norms). For instance, suppose (a)  $S$  rules out those credence functions that are (Brier) accuracy-dominated (AD) by a credence function that is not yet ruled out, *and then* (b)  $S$  rules out those credence functions that violate (PP) given her current knowledge  $K$  concerning objective chance. No non-probabilistic credence functions  $b$  can survive *this* two-step procedure. But, if we *reverse the order* — that is, if we perform (b) first *and then* (a) — then some non-probabilistic credence functions *can* survive.

Here is a simple example that illustrates this *interaction/order-effect*. Suppose  $S$ 's background knowledge  $K$  contains (*exactly*) the following information about the chance of  $P$  (and *no inadmissible evidence*):

(K) The objective chance of  $P$  is 0.2.

Now, suppose (b)  $S$  rules out all the credence functions that violate (PP), *given*  $K$ . Let  $C_b$  be the set of candidate credence functions remaining, after (b). If (a) is applied to the set  $C_b$ , then some non-probabilistic credence functions  $b$  *can* remain in the resulting set  $C_{ba}$ . To see this, it helps to visualize how the (Brier-score versions of the) de Finetti/Joyce arguments work, *geometrically*. Imagine an *incoherent* credence function  $b$  that assigns  $b(P) = 0.2$ , and  $b(\sim P) = 0.7$ . Figure 1 depicts  $b$  (the red dot), and the credence functions  $b'$  that Brier-dominate  $b$  (the shaded manifold of points). The key fact here is that *all of the credence functions  $b'$  which Brier-dominate  $b$  are functions which assign  $b'(P) \neq 0.2$* . This is because all credence functions  $b'$  which Brier-dominate  $b$  must be *strictly between  $b$  and the set of coherent functions* (the dashed line). So, there are no functions  $b'$  which Brier-dominate  $b$ , and yet assign  $b'(P) = 0.2$ .




Figure 1: Visualizing the order-dependence of (AD) and (PP)

Now, imagine an *incoherent* credence function  $b$  that assigns  $b(P) = 0.2$ , in accordance with (PP) & (K), but which also assigns  $b(\sim P) = 0.7$ , like the red dot in Figure 1. [If it helps, you can suppose that  $b$  belongs to an agent  $S$  who falsely believes that some objective chance functions are *not* probability functions.<sup>4</sup>] If we apply (b), then  $b$  is *not* ruled out, but all functions  $b'$  such that  $b'(P) \neq 0.2$  *are* ruled out. Now, if we apply

<sup>4</sup>Because this toy example involves incoherence over the rather trivial partition  $\{P, \sim P\}$ , it is rather difficult to think of *plausible concrete* examples of such agents. We’re using this toy example merely to illustrate a much more general phenomenon. You can imagine a much larger partition (or set) of propositions over which  $S$  is non-probabilistic, and then it becomes much easier to see how an actual agent might come to be incoherent in such a way that the phenomenon we describe here occurs. This is analogous to what happens with preface paradox cases. The smaller they are, the more irrational they seem. But, if they are large (and diverse)

(a), then — because there are no functions left which assign  $b'(P) \neq 0.2$  — there are also no functions left which Brier-dominate  $b$ . Moreover, the only coherent function that is *not* ruled out by (b) is  $b'' = \langle 0.2, 0.8 \rangle$ , which is depicted with a black dot in Figure 1. But, of course,  $b''$  does *not* Brier-dominate  $b$  either.<sup>5</sup>

In the toy case where the algebra consists only of four propositions, and credences in  $\top$  and  $\perp$  are fixed at 1 and 0 respectively, the following result applies:

**Lemma.** If  $b'$  dominates  $b$ , then:

$$\text{either } b(P) > b'(P) \text{ and } b(\sim P) > b'(\sim P) \text{ or } b(P) < b'(P) \text{ and } b(\sim P) < b'(\sim P).$$

*Proof.* If  $b'$  dominates  $b$ , then  $b'$  must have lower inaccuracy both in  $w_1$  and in  $w_2$ . The inaccuracy of a credence function in  $w_1$  is the sum of two terms. If  $b'(P) > b(P)$ , then the first term is greater for  $b'$  than for  $b$ . Thus, if  $b'$  is less inaccurate than  $b$  in  $w_1$ , then the second term must be *lower* for  $b'$  than for  $b$ . But this means that  $b'(\sim P) > b(\sim P)$ . By considering the two terms summing to the inaccuracy in  $w_2$ , we can show that if  $b'(P) < b(P)$ , then  $b'(\sim P) < b(\sim P)$ . Thus, if  $b'(P) \neq b(P)$ , then  $b'(\sim P)$  must also differ from  $b(\sim P)$ , in the same direction. Similar reasoning establishes the converse.  $\square$

This lemma allows us to generate other cases. Consider an agent  $S'$  who has credence function  $b = \langle 0.2, 0.7 \rangle$ , as above, but whose background knowledge concerning the objective chance of  $P$  is (*exactly*) the following:

( $K'$ ) The objective chance of  $P$  is at most 0.7 and the objective chance of  $\sim P$  is at most 0.7.

Such an agent need not be moved by the (mathematical) “existence” of *coherent* credence functions  $b'$  which Brier-dominate  $b$  (*i.e.*, the functions  $b'$  in the bold line segment intersecting the shaded manifold in Figure 1), since all of *those* functions  $b'$  have  $b'(\sim P) > 0.7$ , and are thus *ruled out* as epistemically irrational, in light of  $K'$  and (PP).<sup>6</sup> Unlike our previous example, applying (a) rules out some credence functions whether it is applied before or after (b) (for instance,  $\langle 0.6, 0.6 \rangle$  is ruled out by (a) even if (b) has already been applied) — but if it is applied second, then there are still some incoherent credence functions (like  $\langle 0.2, 0.7 \rangle$ ) that are never ruled out.

In fact, our worry is much more general than these examples involving (PP) suggest. Joyce’s argument tacitly presupposes that — for any incoherent agent  $S$  with credence function  $b$  — some (coherent) functions  $b'$  that Brier-dominate  $b$  are always “available” as “permissible alternative credences” for  $S$ . But, there are various reasons why this may not be the case.<sup>7</sup> The agent could have good reasons for adopting (or sticking with) *some* of their credences. And, if they do, then the fact that some accuracy-dominating (coherent) functions  $b'$  “exist” (in an abstract mathematical sense) may not be epistemologically probative, from their current epistemic perspective. Thus, our use of the Principal Principle (PP) is merely one illustration of this more general phenomenon. Therefore, while one may object to our use of (PP) here for various reasons<sup>8</sup>, our worry will remain pressing, provided only that the following sorts of cases are possible:

( $\star$ ) Cases in which (a)  $S$  is incoherent, (b)  $S$  assigns  $b(p) \in \mathcal{I}$ , for some  $p$  and some interval  $\mathcal{I}$ , (c)  $S$  has good reason to believe (or even *knows*) that epistemic rationality *requires*  $b(p) \in \mathcal{I}$ , *but* (d) all the (coherent) credence functions  $b'$  that Brier-dominate  $S$ ’s credence function  $b$  are such that  $b'(p) \notin \mathcal{I}$ .

enough, they begin to seem rational. We think the dialectic here is analogous. See the *Coda*, below, for a more perspicuous analogy to qualitative “preface-type” cases involving full belief/disbelief.

<sup>5</sup>What we have here is a conflict between *evidential* norms for credences and a certain (accuracy-dominance) *coherence* norm for credences. This is analogous to conflicts that can arise between evidential and coherence norms in the case of full belief (*e.g.*, the preface case). Niko Kolodny [6] has argued that there are *only* evidential norms, and that “coherence norms” do not really exist. We take it that our worry is something that Kolodny would find compelling (and welcome). While we do not wish to take a stand on this issue here, we do think that these sorts of *epistemic priority* questions are crucial in this context.

<sup>6</sup>We here assume a slightly stronger version of (PP) than that stated above — (PP') If  $S$  knows that the objective chance of  $p$  is less than  $r$ , and  $S$  has no inadmissible evidence regarding  $p$ , then  $S$  should not assign a credence greater than  $r$  to  $p$ .

<sup>7</sup>Presently, we’re concerned with *evidential* reasons why such  $b'$ ’s may be unavailable to an agent. There may also be *psychological* reasons why some “alternative  $b'$ -functions” may be unavailable, but we are bracketing that possibility here.

<sup>8</sup>For instance, the (PP) was originally intended [7] to be applied to agents with “reasonable” — indeed, *probabilistic* — credence functions. In addition, the (PP) was originally intended to be applied to *initial* credence functions, which would not be informed by specific bodies of empirical knowledge regarding objective chances (*e.g.*, our  $K$  and  $K'$  above). For these reasons, our present applications of (PP) are not (strictly speaking) kosher. Ultimately, however, our worry will remain — so long as examples satisfying ( $\star$ ) are possible (see below). And, we see no reason to doubt that such examples exist.

We have tried to describe some simple, toy cases satisfying  $(\star)$  — by making use of (PP). Even if one thinks our toy (PP) examples are infelicitous (see *fn.* 8), this won't be enough to make our worry go away. In order to avoid our worry completely, one would need to argue that no examples satisfying  $(\star)$  are possible. And, *that* is a tall order. Surely, we can imagine that an *oracle* concerning epistemic rationality has informed  $S$  that  $b(p) \in \mathcal{I}$  is *required* — despite the fact that all (coherent) Brier-dominating functions  $b'$  are such that  $b'(p) \notin \mathcal{I}$ . While such cases are fanciful, it seems to us that they are sufficient to motivate our worry.

It is interesting to note that Dutch Book arguments do *not* have this feature. As far as (DB) is concerned, it doesn't matter if you have good reasons for sticking with some of your credences. Suppose you do. Nonetheless, it remains true that if (and only if) you're incoherent, you're susceptible to Dutch Book. And, this gives you some reason (albeit a pragmatic reason) to change your *other* credences, so as to bring yourself into a coherent doxastic state. In the example(s) depicted in Figure 1, for instance, (DB) would give  $S/S'$  some reason (albeit a pragmatic one) to change their credence in  $\sim P$  from 0.7 to 0.8. So, this “order-dependence” is a *peculiarity* of “accuracy-dominance”-based approaches to probabilism.

#### 4 MODESTY AND PROPRIETY

A version of this worry applies to another argument Joyce makes on a related topic. In [4], he wants to consider inaccuracy measures other than the Brier score. For any inaccuracy measure, he says that a credence function  $b$  is *modest* if it assigns a lower expected inaccuracy to some credence function other than itself. He says,

Modest credences, it can be argued, are epistemically defective because they undermine their own adoption and use. ... If, relative to a person's own credences, some alternative system of beliefs has a lower expected epistemic disutility, then, by her own estimation, that system is preferable from the epistemic perspective. This puts her in an untenable doxastic situation. [4, p. 277]

He uses this argument to assert a principle,

IMMODESTY: An epistemic scoring rule  $S$  should not render any credences modest when there are epistemic circumstances under which those credences are clearly the rational ones to hold. [4, p. 278]

He then uses the Principal Principle (PP) to argue that *any* coherent set of credences  $\hat{b}$  *could*, in certain circumstances (*viz.*, circumstances in which  $S$  *knows* that the salient objective chance function is identical to  $\hat{b}$ ), be clearly the rational ones to hold, which then puts a constraint on what the scoring rule  $S$  should look like. (In particular, it should satisfy a principle he calls “Propriety”.<sup>9</sup>)

However, this argument relies on the same point about the order of application of rules for ruling out credence functions. He defines modesty in terms of the existence of some alternative set of credences that would have lower expected inaccuracy. However, the mere formal existence of such an alternative is no problem, if that alternative has already been ruled out for some other reason. Compare:

If, relative to a person's own credences, some alternative [action] has a [higher expected utility], then by her own estimation, that [action] is preferable from the [pragmatic] perspective. A [utility function  $U$ ] should not render any [action] modest when there are [pragmatic] circumstances under which [that action is] clearly the rational one to [perform].

This initially sounds plausible. But when we consider the actions we perform in everyday life, they will clearly all be “modest” in this sense. There is always some formally defined alternative that would be better — rather than betting a dollar at even odds on the outcome of a coin flip, I should choose the action that pays me a million dollars regardless of how the coin comes up! But this is no criticism of my action, since the alternative that is better is one that is not *available* to me. If we applied the modesty constraint to utility functions, we would have to make some *ad hoc* move to say that my utility function should always assign these unavailable actions lower expected utility than the best available action. The right thing to do here is to define “modest” actions as ones such that some alternative *available* action has a higher expected utility.

<sup>9</sup>Alan Hájek objects to Joyce's argument here by arguing that there are in fact coherent credence functions that couldn't be the objective chances [3, pp. 814-6]. We argue here that *even if* every coherent credence function *could be* the objective chance function, (PP) may interact differently with Joyce's other rules than he suggests.

If we apply this thought back to the epistemic case, then we see that we can only argue for IMMODESTY where “modest” is understood relative to the *available* credence functions. If violations of the Principal Principle are taken to render a credence function *unavailable*, then IMMODESTY no longer supports the constraint Joyce argues for.

This requires some consideration of what the role of the Principal Principle is in constraining belief. If it helps determine which credence functions are available, then as we have seen, both of Joyce’s arguments run into problems. One might instead think that violation of the Principal Principle doesn’t make a credence function unavailable, but instead just represents some dimension of epistemic “badness”. If this badness is different from the badness of inaccuracy, then it becomes clear that Joyce’s arguments need to be modified — even if  $b'$  dominates  $b$  with respect to inaccuracy, if  $b$  has less *overall* epistemic badness, then  $b$  may still be perfectly acceptable as a credence function. Thus, Joyce’s arguments would need to consider overall badness rather than just inaccuracy.

The only way to save Joyce’s arguments here seems to be to say that somehow the badness of violating the Principal Principle is *already included* when one has evaluated the accuracy of a credence function. Perhaps there is some way to argue for this claim.<sup>10</sup> But this claim at least seems quite surprising, and needs more support than it has been given — especially, in light of the apparent possibility of *other* [non-(PP)-based] ways of generating ( $\star$ )-cases (*e.g.*, “epistemic oracles”).

## 5 Coda: AN ANALOGOUS DIALECTIC CONCERNING FULL BELIEF/DISBELIEF

It is perhaps easier to appreciate the full force of our worry about Joyce’s argument for probabilism by considering an analogous dialectic that can arise in the case of full belief (and disbelief). Let  $S$  be an *opinionated* agent — one who either believes or disbelieves (and not both) each proposition  $p$  in their doxastic algebra. Let  $B_S(p)$  assert that  $S$  believes  $p$  and  $D_S(p)$  assert that  $S$  disbelieves  $p$ . Now, consider the following (uncontroversial) definition(s) of (in)accuracy for beliefs and disbeliefs (at a world  $w$ ):

- $B_S(p)$  is (in)accurate at  $w$  iff  $p$  is true (false) at  $w$ .
- $D_S(p)$  is (in)accurate at  $w$  iff  $p$  is false (true) at  $w$ .

Let  $\mathcal{B}$  be  $S$ ’s full (opinionated) set of qualitative judgments over their entire doxastic algebra. Now, we can define a notion of *accuracy-dominance* for qualitative judgment sets, as follows:

- $\mathcal{B}'$  *accuracy-dominates*  $\mathcal{B}$  iff  $\mathcal{B}'$  contains *strictly fewer* inaccurate judgments than  $\mathcal{B}$  at *some* worlds, and  $\mathcal{B}'$  contains *at most as many* inaccurate judgments as  $\mathcal{B}$  at *every* world.

This leads to the following notion of *incoherence* for the qualitative judgments of an opinionated agent.

- $S$  is *incoherent* iff their qualitative judgment set  $\mathcal{B}$  is accuracy-dominated by some alternative set  $\mathcal{B}'$ .

The resulting notion of qualitative coherence is the analogue of Joyce’s notion of quantitative coherence.<sup>11</sup> And, it could be argued that this notion of coherence should undergird an iron-clad requirement of epistemic rationality for full belief (and disbelief). We will not (presently<sup>12</sup>) investigate the coherence norms that result from these definitions. Rather, we only wish to use them here for the purpose of articulating the analogue of our worry about Joyce’s argument for probabilism. We will do so *via* a simple toy example.

Imagine a toy opinionated agent  $S$  with a language  $\mathcal{L}$  containing just two atomic sentences  $X$  and  $Y$ . Suppose that  $S$ ’s *incoherent* (in the above sense) qualitative judgment set  $\mathcal{B}$  over the resulting algebra of 16 propositions is as depicted in the second column of Table 1, below (here,  $B$  represents belief and  $D$  represents disbelief of the corresponding proposition). It can be shown that the set  $\mathcal{B}'$  in the second column of Table 1 is the *unique* set of qualitative judgments that accuracy-dominates  $\mathcal{B}$  (in the above sense).

<sup>10</sup>Perhaps the arguments in [5] should be taken to show that *all* dimensions of epistemic badness are already included in the measure of inaccuracy. His defense of “Extensionality” on pp. 591-2 of [5] already suggests that he expects some additional epistemic constraints to arise out of accuracy once we consider realistic models rather than toy models.

<sup>11</sup>Indeed, it is *less controversial*, since there is *little or no* controversy about how accuracy should be defined for qualitative judgments. In any case, Joyce [5, p. 577] certainly agrees with this assessment.

<sup>12</sup>It can be shown that the resulting notion of qualitative coherence is *strictly weaker* than deductive consistency. Moreover, this new notion of coherence has many interesting properties and applications. We won’t delve into the details of this new notion of qualitative coherence here. We are writing a longer paper in which we investigate it more fully [2].

	$\mathcal{B}$	$\mathcal{B}'$
$\sim X \& \sim Y$	$B$	$D$
$X \& \sim Y$	$B$	$D$
$X \& Y$	$B$	$D$
$\sim X \& Y$	$D$	$D$
$\sim Y$	$B$	$B$
$X \equiv Y$	$B$	$B$
$\sim X$	$D$	$D$
$X$	$B$	$B$
$\sim(X \equiv Y)$	$D$	$D$
$Y$	$D$	$D$
$X \vee \sim Y$	$B$	$B$
$\sim X \vee \sim Y$	$B$	$B$
$\sim X \vee Y$	$B$	$B$
$X \vee Y$	$B$	$B$
$X \vee \sim X$	$B$	$B$
$X \& \sim X$	$D$	$D$

Table 1: An incoherent belief set  $\mathcal{B}$  and the *unique* alternative  $\mathcal{B}'$  that accuracy-dominates it.

By analogy with Joyce’s argument for probabilism, one would say that  $\mathcal{B}'$  should “look *epistemically better*” to  $S$  than their current set of qualitative judgments  $\mathcal{B}$ . But, suppose further that  $S$  *knows* the following:

( $K''$ ) The conjunction  $X \& \sim Y$  is true.

If  $S$  knows  $K''$ , then  $S$  can *rule out*  $\mathcal{B}'$  as a candidate alternative set of qualitative judgments, since  $\mathcal{B}'$  entails *disbelief* in the conjunction  $X \& \sim Y$ , and  $S$  *knows* that  $D_S(X \& \sim Y)$  is (actually) *incorrect*. Should  $S$  (still) be moved by the fact that their judgment set is accuracy-dominated by  $\mathcal{B}'$ ? We don’t think so. Or, at least, we think it will require further argument to *explain why*  $S$  should be moved by the fact that she is accuracy-dominated in this case. After all,  $S$  knows something ( $K''$ ) which allows her to *rule out* (as *epistemically irrational*) *all of the accuracy-dominating alternative judgment sets*  $\mathcal{B}'$ . This is analogous to our  $(\star)$ -cases involving *quantitative* accuracy-dominance. In both contexts,  $S$  is in a position to *rule out* (as *epistemically irrational*) *all of the accuracy-dominating alternative sets of judgments* (be they quantitative or qualitative). And, in both contexts, we think the onus is on the defender of the corresponding coherence norms to explain why accuracy-dominance should trump what seem to be very compelling, countervailing epistemic (*viz.*, *evidential*) considerations (see *fn. 4* for more on the quantitative/qualitative analogy).

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