


Why Epistemology Can't be Operationalized

- (L) Condition C is luminous if and only if in every case in which C obtains, one is in a position to know that C obtains.
- (O0) C is luminous. Assumption
- (O1_i) If at t_i one is in a position to know that C obtains, then at t_{i+1} C obtains. Assumption
- (O2_i) If at t_i C obtains, then at t_i one is in a position to know that C obtains. O0, LP
- (O3_i) At t_i C obtains. Assumption
- (O4_i) At t_i one is in a position to know that C obtains. O2_i, O3_i, MP
- (O3_{i+1}) At t_{i+1} C obtains. O1_i, O4_i, MP
- (O3₀) At t_0 C obtains. Assumption
- (O3_n) At t_n C obtains. O3_i → O3_{i+1}, $i=0, \dots, n-1$
- (O5) At t_n C does not obtain. Assumption
- (LP1) Condition C is *luminous in probability 1* if and only if in every case in which C obtains, the probability that C obtains is 1.
- (0) C is luminous in probability 1. Assumption
- (1_i) If at t_i the probability that C obtains is 1, then at t_{i+1} C obtains. Assumption
- (2_i) If at t_i C obtains, then at t_i the probability that C obtains is 1. 0, LP
- (3_i) At t_i C obtains. Assumption
- (4_i) At t_i the probability that C obtains is 1. 2_i, 3_i, MP
- (3_{i+1}) At t_{i+1} C obtains. 1_i, 4_i, MP
- (3₀) At t_0 C obtains. Assumption
- (3_n) At t_n C obtains. 3_i → 3_{i+1}, $i=0, \dots, n-1$
- (5) At t_n C does not obtain. Assumption

- (0) C is luminous in probability 1. Assumption
- (1) If C obtains at no time in a nonempty interval (t, t^{**}) , then at no time in the interval $(t-\epsilon, t^{**}+\epsilon)$ is the probability that C obtains 1. Assumption
- (2) If at no time in the interval $(t-\epsilon, t^{**}+\epsilon)$ is the probability that C obtains 1, then C obtains at no time in the interval $(t-\epsilon, t^{**}+\epsilon)$. 0, LP
- (6) If C obtains at no time in a nonempty interval (t, t^{**}) , then C obtains at no time in the interval $(t-\epsilon, t^{**}+\epsilon)$. 1, 2
- (7₀) C obtains at no time in the interval $(t-\delta, t)$. Assumption
- (7_i) C obtains at no time in the interval $(t-\delta-i\epsilon, t+i\epsilon)$. (6), (7₀)
- (7) C obtains at no time in the interval $[t_0, t_n]$. (7_i)
- (3₀) At t_0 C obtains. Assumption

(LP_x) Condition C is *luminous in probability x* if and only if in every case in which C obtains, the probability that C obtains is x.



(LP_{>x}) Condition C is *luminous in probability > x* if and only if in every case in which C obtains, the probability that C obtains is more than x.

In every case in which C obtains, the probability that C obtains is more than 0.5.

Expectation (finite case) $E(X) = \sum_{x \in I} xP(X = x)$

Example. Time is discrete. At each time t : $P(T = t-1) = P(T = t) = P(T = t+1) = 1/3$. Thus always $E(T) = T$.

There are countably many atomic variables X, Y, Z, \dots (informally, denoting real numbers; they correspond to random variables).

For each rational number c there is an atomic constant $[c]$ (informally, denoting c).

If T and U are terms then $T+U$ is a term ($+$ is informally read as ‘plus’).

If A is a formula then $\neg A$ is a formula (\neg is informally read as ‘it is not the case that’).

If A and B are formulas then $A \& B$ is a formula ($\&$ is informally read as ‘and’).

If A is a formula then $V(A)$ is a term (V is informally read as ‘the truth-value of’).

If T and U are terms then $T \leq U$ is a formula (\leq is informally read as ‘is less than or equal to’).

If T is a term then $E(T)$ is a term (E is informally read as ‘the expectation of’).

‘ $T=U$ ’ abbreviates $T \leq U \& U \leq T$.

‘ $T < U$ ’ abbreviates $T \leq U \& \neg U \leq T$.

‘ $P(A)$ ’ abbreviates $E(V(A))$ (P is informally read as ‘the probability of’).

A *model* is a triple $\langle W, \text{Prob}, F \rangle$, where W is a nonempty set, Prob is a function from members of W to probability distributions over W and F is a function from atomic terms to their intensions (functions from members of W to real numbers).

$\text{val}(w, A)$: truth-value at w of A

$\text{den}(w, A)$: denotation at w of T , $\text{den}(w, T)$

If T is an atomic variable, $\text{den}(w, T) = F(T)(w)$.

If c is a rational number, $\text{den}(w, [c]) = c$.

If T and U are terms, $\text{den}(w, T+U) = \text{den}(w, T) + \text{den}(w, U)$.

If A is a formula, $\text{val}(w, \neg A) = 1 - \text{val}(w, A)$.

If A and B are formulas, $\text{val}(w, A \& B) = \min\{\text{val}(w, A), \text{val}(w, B)\}$.

If A is a formula, $\text{den}(w, V(A)) = \text{val}(w, A)$.

If T and U are terms, $\text{val}(w, T \leq U) = 1$ if $\text{den}(w, T) \leq \text{den}(w, U)$ and 0 otherwise.

If T is a term, $\text{den}(w, E(T))$ is the expectation with respect to the probability distribution $\text{Prob}(w)$ of the random variable whose value at each world $x \in W$ is $\text{den}(x, T)$.

For example if W is finite, then $\text{den}(w, E(T)) = \sum_{x \in W} \text{den}(x, T) \text{Prob}(w)(\{x\})$

Count $\langle W, \text{Prob}, F \rangle$ as a model only if $\text{den}(w, E(T))$ is well-defined for every $w \in W$ and term T .

Example. $W = \{u, v, w\}$.

$$\text{Prob}(u)(\{u\}) = \text{Prob}(u)(\{v\}) = \frac{1}{2} \quad \text{Prob}(u)(\{w\}) = 0$$

$$\text{Prob}(v)(\{u\}) = \text{Prob}(v)(\{v\}) = \text{Prob}(v)(\{w\}) = \frac{1}{3}$$

$$\text{Prob}(w)(\{u\}) = 0 \quad \text{Prob}(w)(\{v\}) = \text{Prob}(w)(\{w\}) = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\text{den}(u, X) = F(X)(u) = 8; \text{den}(v, X) = F(X)(v) = 4; \text{den}(w, X) = F(X)(w) = 0$$

$$\text{den}(u, E(X)) = 6, \text{den}(v, E(X)) = 4, \text{den}(w, E(X)) = 2$$

$$\text{den}(u, E(E(X))) = 5, \text{den}(v, E(E(X))) = 4, \text{den}(w, E(E(X))) = 3$$

$$E(E(X)) = E(X)?$$

$$\text{Var}(X) = E((X-E(X))^2)$$

Example. Where $E(T) = T$.

$$\text{Wide-scope calculation: } \text{Var}(T) = ((T-1-T)^2 + (T-T)^2 + (T+1-T)^2)/3 = 2/3.$$

Narrow-scope calculation: Since certainly $E(T) = T$, 'Var'(T) = 0.

SORITES For any $w, x \in W$, there are $w_0, \dots, w_n \in W$ such that $w = w_0, x = w_n$ and for $0 \leq i, j \leq n$, if $|i-j| \leq 1$ then $\text{Prob}(w_i)(\{w_j\}) > 0$.

Proposition. Let the set of worlds be finite and SORITES hold. Then for any random variable T, if $E(T) = T$ at every world then T has the same value at every world.

UNCMAX For some $w \in W$: for all $x \in W$, $\text{den}(x, T) \leq \text{den}(w, T)$, but $\text{Prob}(w)(\{x: \text{den}(x, T) < \text{den}(w, T)\}) > 0$.

Proposition. Let the set of worlds be finite and SORITES hold. Then for any random variable T, the sequence T, E(T), E(E(T)), ... converges to the same limit whichever world one is at.

TW 18.v.2006