Chapter 4, Expressivism and Subjectivism
1. The following two sentences are synonymous, as uttered by me:
   a. ‘I am at MIT.’ — ‘Jack is at MIT.’
2. According to a simple speaker subjectivism, the following two sentences are synonymous, as uttered by me:
   a. ‘Slavery is wrong.’ — ‘I disapprove of slavery.’
3. This simple speaker subjectivism seems to make false predictions.
4. The modal problem
   a. If I did not disapprove of slavery, then it wouldn’t be the case that I disapproved of slavery.’ = True
   b. If I did not disapprove of slavery, then it wouldn’t be the case that slavery is wrong.’ = False
5. The disagreement problem

Phil: ‘Slavery is wrong.’
Sally: ‘That’s false—slavery is not wrong.’ = Disagreement

Phil: ‘I disapprove of slavery.’
Sally: ‘That’s false—I do not disapprove of slavery.’ = Not Disagreement

6. Diagnosis: speaker subjectivism conflates reporting with expressing.

‘Slavery is wrong’ : ‘I disapprove of slavery’ :: ‘Grass is green’ : ‘I believe that grass is green’ [Schroeder p. 72].

7. Modal problem: ‘If I didn’t believe that grass is green, then it wouldn’t be the case that grass is green’. = False. Also disagreement problem:

Phil: ‘Grass is green.’
Sally: ‘That’s false—I do not believe that grass is green.’ = Not a Disagreement

Chapter 5, Moral Thought and Disagreement
8. Direction of fit: mind-to-world (belief-like) and world-to-mind (desire-like).
9. Expressivism: what I express when utter Slavery is wrong’ may be called a belief, but it is different than descriptive beliefs because it has a world-to-mind direction of fit.
10. Challenge to expressivism: I believe that slavery is wrong and thereby disagree with everyone who, like Nietzsche and Aristotle, believe that slavery is not wrong. How can there be such a disagreement, by expressivist lights? How can states with world-to-mind direction of fit disagree?

11. Definition: If it follows from the fact that Agent1 Vs that $P$ and Agent2 Vs that $\sim P$ that Agent1 and Agent2 disagree, then Ving has the **interpersonal disagreement** property.
   a. Belief has the interpersonal disagreement property.
   b. Fear does not have the interpersonal disagreement:
      i. Someone who fears that monsters are coming does not thereby disagree with someone who fears that monsters are not coming [Cf. Schroeder, p. 89].

12. Definition: If it follows from the fact Agent1 Vs that $P$ and Agent1 Vs that $\sim P$ that Agent1 disagrees with herself, then Ving has the **intrapersonal disagreement** property.
   a. Belief has the intrapersonal disagreement property.
   b. Fear does not have the intrapersonal disagreement property

13. Two Big Questions:
   a. Do any states with world-to-mind direction of fit have the interpersonal disagreement property?
      i. If not, expressivism is dead.
   b. Why do attitudes have the disagreement properties they have?

**World-to-Mind Disagreement**

14. Stevenson and Gibbard say plans have the interpersonal disagreement property.

15. One argument that plans have the interpersonal disagreement property: joint planning.

[I]f we are planning to spend the evening together, you might intend for us to go to the symphony, but I might intend for us to go to the cinema. If those are our respective intentions, then it seems like we do disagree. We disagree about what to do this evening [Schroeder, p. 89].

16. Problem: ‘Slavery is wrong’ does not express a joint plan. It expresses an individual plan.

17. A second argument that plans have the interpersonal disagreement property: plans have the intrapersonal disagreement property, and any attitude that has the intrapersonal disagreement property also has the interpersonal disagreement property
If you believe that that Colorado is rectangular, but also believe that Colorado is not rectangular, then you are being inconsistent. [...] [W]hen you believe both, you are disagreement with yourself. There is a special kind of rational clash among your beliefs. [...] If you intend to meet me at the symphony and also plan to not meet me at the symphony, then your plans clash in a very uncomfortable way—it is generally irrational to have such plans, in plausibly the same sort of way that it is generally irrational to believe both that Colorado is rectangular and believe that Colorado is not rectangular [Schroeder, pp. 89-91].

18. Problem: The linking is principle is not obvious. Not all combinations of internal attitudes that clash also clash across people

   a. If I strictly prefer A to B and strictly prefer B to A, then there is an uncomfortable clash in my preferences. Perhaps, in some sense, I disagree with myself.
      i. But if I prefer A to B and you prefer B to A, we do not thereby disagree.

   b. If I attend (with the aim of fully attending) on A attend (with the aim of fully attending) on B, then there is internal clash.
      i. But no external clash.

   c. If I plan to fill my free time with doodling and I prefer to fill my free time not doodling (rather painting), then there is kind of clash. Perhaps I disagree with myself.
      i. But If I plan to fill my free time doodling and you plan to fill your free time not doodling (rather, painting), it is not obvious that we disagree.

Why do Attitudes Have the Disagreement Properties They Have?

19. What is moral disagreement?—A structural clash?
20. How can explain why belief has the interpersonal and intrapersonal disagreement properties.
21. One option: an alethic explanation.
22. Disagreement is a matter truth.

   a. A set of beliefs \( \{B_1, \ldots, B_n\} \) disagree with one another if and only if it is not possible for all of the beliefs in the set to be true.

   b. If I believe that P and that \( \neg P \), then it is not possible for both of my beliefs to be true; hence they disagree.

   c. If you believe that P and I believe that \( \neg P \), then it is not possible for both of our beliefs to be true; hence they disagree.

23. Another option: a normative explanation.
24. Disagreement is a matter of norm-satisfaction.
25. The truth norm: Beliefs ought to be true.
26. Disagreement is a matter of satisfying the truth norm.
   a. A set beliefs \{B_1, \ldots, B_n\} disagree with one another if and only if it is not possible for all of the beliefs to satisfy the truth norm.
   b. If I believe that P and \sim P, then it is not possible for both of my beliefs to satisfy a norm of belief—the truth norm; hence they disagree.
   c. If you believe that P and I believe that \sim P, then it is not possible for both of our beliefs to satisfy a norm of belief—the truth norm; hence they disagree.
27. But it is unclear whether other norms generate disagreement.
28. The evidential norms: Beliefs ought to be supported by the evidence.
29. Take the following two beliefs:
   a. The belief that P, and the belief that one’s own total evidence does not support the belief that P.
   b. Given some plausible principles, it is not possible for both of these believes to satisfy the evidential norm of belief; hence they ought to disagree.
      i. But do they?
30. Hypothesis: The truth norm is a success norm, whereas the evidential norm is a procedural norm.
   a. There are attitudes that cannot all satisfy their success norms—this is ‘disagreement’, or at least one important kind.
   b. Then, there are attitudes that cannot all satisfy their procedural norms—this is something else, a clash, a ‘disagreement’ in another sense.
31. Three options for expressivists:
   a. Deny the distinction
   b. Claim that a disagreement about whether slavery is wrong is a procedural clash, whereas a disagreement about whether Colorado is rectangular is a success clash.
   c. Claim that a disagreement about whether slavery is wrong is a success clash.
      i. Challenge: This options entails that the world-to-mind direction of fit attitude must be something that can succeed.