Knowledge and its Limits

TOC: [ Texts ] [ Requirements ] [ Website ] [ Tentative Schedule ]

Texts
There is only one required text for the course: Tim Williamson's book Knowledge and its Limits. Note that the entire book is available online (UCB subscription only) via Oxford Scholarship Online. It should also be available at local bookstores, and (of course) you can always get a copy online. We plan to work through the book at a pace of one chapter per week. There are twelve chapters, which is just about right for the semester (given that Williamson will be visiting in the second week of the seminar – see below).

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Requirements

• We will expect enrolled students to write one term paper for the seminar. There may also be (optional) student presentations. That will depend on enrollment, motivation, and other factors.

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Website
Current course information can be found on the course web site, at:

http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~fitelson/williamson/

The home page of our website is reserved mainly for announcements. The purpose of the other pages on our website should be self–explanatory. You should keep an eye on the course website, as it will be updated regularly with various content and announcements pertaining to the course. The only two computer applications you will need to view/print, etc. the content on our website are: (i) your favorite web browser, and (ii) Adobe Reader (version 6 or later, or – if you prefer – another program that can read Acrobat PDF version 6 files).

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Tentative Schedule (subject to change – so stay tuned)

• Week 1: Chapter 1 – "A State of Mind"
  • Secondary sources cited in main text of chapter 1 (in typographical order)
    • Prichard, H. A. 1950. Knowledge and Perception. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Hintikka, K. J. J. 1962. Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
    • McDowell, J. H. 1982. ‘Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge.’ Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 455–479.
    • Craig, E. J. 1990a. Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Russell, B. A. W. 1910–11. ‘Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11: 108–28.
    • Perner, J. 1993. Understanding the Representational Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    • Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    • Vendler, Z. 1967. Linguistics in Philosophy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
    • Unger, P. 1972. ‘Propositional verbs and knowledge.’ Journal of Philosophy, 69: 301–12.
      —— 1975. Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Steup, M. 1992. ‘Memory.’ In J. Dancy and E. Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.
    • Steward, H. 1997. The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes and States. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Radford, C. 1966. ‘Knowledge—by examples.’ Analysis, 27: 1–11.
    • Armstrong, D. M. 1973. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Shope, R. K. 1983. The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    • Austin, J. L. 1946. ‘Other minds.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. 20: 148–87.
    • Vendler, Z. 1972. Res Cogitans. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
    • Williamson, T. 1999. ‘Truthmakers and the converse Barcan formula.’ Dialectica, 53: 253–70.
    • Hinton, J. M. 1967. ‘Visual experiences.’ Mind, 76: 217–27.
      —— 1973. Experiences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Snowdon, P. 1980–1. ‘Perception, vision and causation.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 81: 175–92.
      —— 1990. ‘The objects of perceptual experience.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. 64: 121–50.
    • Child, T. W. 1994. Causality, Interpretation and the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Dancy, J. 1995. ‘Arguments from illusion.’ Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 421–38.
    • Martin, M. G. F. 1997. ‘The reality of appearances’. In R. M. Sainsbury (ed.), Thought and Ontology. Milan: Franco Angeli.
    • Fodor, J. A. 1981. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    • Burge, T. 1979. ‘Individualism and the mental.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4: 73–121.
  • Some critical pieces pertaining to chapter 1
    • E. J. Lowe's review of Knowledge and its Limits
    • Gilbert Harman's review of Knowledge and its Limits
• Week 2: Chapter 2 – "Broadness"
  • Secondary literature cited in main text of chapter 2 (in typographical order)
    • Fodor, J. A. 1981. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive
      Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    • Burge, T. 1979. ‘Individualism and the mental.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4: 73–121.
    • Lewis, D. K. 1979. ‘Attitudes de dicto and de se.’ Philosophical Review, 88: 513–43.
    • Putnam, H. 1973. ‘Meaning and reference.’ Journal of Philosophy, 70: 699–711.
    • McDowell, J. H. 1977. ‘On the sense and reference of a proper name.’ Mind, 86: 159–85.
    • Evans, M. G. J. 1982. The Varieties of Reference, ed. J. H. McDowell. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Stich, S. P. 1978. ‘Autonomous psychology and the belief-desire thesis.’ The Monist, 61: 573–91.
    • Kim, J. 1993. Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Shope, R. K. 1983. The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    • Fricker, E. M. 1999. ‘Knowing is not a state of mind.’ Unpublished typescript.
    • Noonan, H. W. 1993. ‘Object-dependent thoughts: a case of superficial necessity but deep
      contingency?’ In J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Pettit, P. 1986. ‘Broad-minded explanation and psychology.’ In Pettit and McDowell 1986.
    • Child, T. W. 1994. Causality, Interpretation and the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Hyman, J. 1999. ‘How knowledge works.’ Philosophical Quarterly, 49: 433–51.
  • Some critical pieces pertaining to chapter 2
    • Fricker, E. M. ‘Knowing is not a state of mind’
    • Yablo, S. Causal Relevance
• Week 3: Tim Williamson (also our Townsend Visitor) will preside
  • This meeting will be less structured (by us). We'll let Tim lead us this week.
  • He encourages students to email him with questions before the meeting.
• Week 4: Chapter 3 – Primeness
  • Secondary literature cited in main text of chapter 3 (in typographical order)
    • Jackson, F. 1996. ‘Mental causation.’ Mind, 105: 377–413.
    • Hurley, S. L. 1998. Consciousness in Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    • Fodor, J. A. 1987. Psychosemantics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
      —— 1994. The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    • Burge, T. 1986b. ‘Individualism and psychology.’ Philosophical Review, 95: 3–45.
    • Peacocke, C. A. B. 1993. ‘Externalist explanation.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93: 203–30.
    • Harman, G. 1973. Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
      —— 1980. ‘Reasoning and evidence one does not possess.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 163–82.
    • Goldman, A. 1976. ‘Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.’ Journal of Philosophy, 73: 771–91.
    • Putnam, H. 1978. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
    • Jackson, F. and Pettit, P. 1995. ‘Some content is narrow.’ In J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Yablo, S. 1992. ‘Mental causation.’ Philosophical Review, 101: 245–80.
      —— 1997. ‘Wide causation.’ In J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 11: Mind, Causation, and World. Oxford: Blackwell.
    • Steward, H. 1997. The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes and States. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Some Salient Secondary Readings
  • Pages 1-6 and pages 126-128 of Sherri's Tracking Truth
  • Williamson on the Primeness of Knowing, by Tony Brueckner
  • The Inescapability of Gettier Problems, by Linda Zagzebski
  • The role of contrast in causal and explanatory claims, by Chris Hitchcock
  • The Pragmatic Theory of Explanation, by Bas van Fraassen
  • Detachment, Probability, and Maximum Likelihood, by Gil Harman
• Causal Relevance, by Steve Yablo (even more relevant this week!)
• Williamson on Knowledge and Psychological Explanation, by P.D. Magnus and Jonathan Cohen
• Week 5: Chapter 4 – Anti-Luminosity
  • Secondary literature cited in main text of chapter 4 (in typographical order)
    • Wittgenstein, L. 1958. Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed., ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
      —— 1969. On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
    • McDowell, J. H. 1989. ‘One strand in the private language argument’. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 33/34: 285–303.
    • Dummett, M. A. E. 1978. Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth.
      —— 1981. Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn. London: Duckworth.
      —— 1993. The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Boghossian, P. 1994. ‘The transparency of mental content.’ Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 33–50.
    • Conee, E., and Feldman, R. 1998. ‘The generality problem for reliabilism.’ Philosophical Studies, 89: 1–29.
    • Peacocke, C. A. B. 1981. ‘Are vague predicates incoherent?’ Synthese, 46: 121–41.
    • Williamson, T. 1994b. Vagueness. London: Routledge.
    • Dummett, M. A. E. 1977. Elements of Intuitionism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Weinstein, S. 1983. ‘The intended interpretation of intuitionistic logic.’ Journal of Philosophical Logic, 12: 261–70.
    • Pagin, P. 1994. ‘Knowledge of proofs.’ Topoi, 13: 93–100.
    • Williamson, T. 1995a. ‘Does assertibility satisfy the S4 axiom?’ Crítica, 27: 3–22.
• Some Salient Secondary Readings
  • Luminous Margins, by Brian Weatherson
  • Knowledge and Evidence, by John Hawthorne
  • The Comforts of Home, by Earl Conee
  • Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument, by Tony Brueckner and Oreste Fiocco
  • Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge, by Ram Neta and Guy Rohrbaugh
  • Pages 117-128 and page 148 of Sherri's Tracking Truth
  • Unsafe Knowledge, by Juan Comesaña
    
• Week 6: Chapter 5 – Margins & Iterations
  • Secondary literature cited in main text of chapter 5 (in typographical order)
    • Sorensen, R. A. 1988. Blindspots. New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Salmon, N. U. 1982. Reference and Essence. Oxford: Blackwell.
      —— 1986. ‘Modal paradox: parts and counterparts, points and counterpoints.’ in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: Studies in Essentialism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
      —— 1989. ‘The logic of what might have been.’ Philosophical Review, 98: 3–34.
    • Williamson, T. 1990a. Identity and Discrimination. Oxford: Blackwell.
    • Salmon, N. U. 1982. 1993. ‘This side of paradox.’ Philosophical Topics, 21: 187–97.
    • Fagin, R., Halpern, J. Y., Moses, Y., and Vardi, M. Y. 1995. Reasoning about Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    • Shin, H. S. and Williamson, T. 1996. ‘How much common belief is necessary for a convention?’ Games and Economic Behavior, 13: 252–68.
    • Sainsbury, R. M. 1997. ‘Easy possibilities.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57: 907–19. Salmon, N. U. 1982. Reference and Essence. Oxford: Blackwell.
    • Peacocke, C. A. B. 1999. Being Known. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Williamson, T. 1994b. Vagueness. London: Routledge.
    • Williamson, T. 1992a. ‘An alternative rule of disjunction in modal logic.’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 33: 89–100.
    • Mott, P. 1998. ‘Margins for error and the sorites paradox.’ Philosophical Quarterly, 48: 494–504.
    • Williamson, T. 2000b. ‘Margins for error: a reply.’ Philosophical Quarterly, 50: 76–81.
• Some Salient Secondary Readings
  • KT and the Diamond of Knowledge, by Adrian Heathcote
  • Williamson's Argument Against the KK Principle, by Murali Ramachandran
  • The KK thesis and the status of reflective knowledge (last section of an extended review of KAIL), by Ernest Sosa
• Week 7: Chapter 6 – An Application
  • Secondary literature cited in main text of chapter 6 (in typographical order)
    • Sorensen, R. A. 1988. Blindspots. New York: Oxford University Press. Buy this book.
    • Bovens, L. 1997. ‘The backward induction argument for the finite iterated prisoner's dilemmas and the surprise exam paradox.’ Analysis, 57: 179–86.
    • Hall, N. 1999. ‘How to set a surprise exam.’ Mind, 108: 647–703.
    • Jackson, F. 1987. Conditionals. Oxford: Blackwell.
    • Janaway, C. 1989. ‘Knowing about surprises: a supposed antinomy revisited.’ Mind, 98: 391–409.
    • Koons, R. C. 1992. Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Sainsbury, R. M. 1995. Paradoxes, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Weintraub, R. 1995. ‘The Surprise Examination paradox.’ Ratio, 8: 161–9.
    • Wright, C. J. G. and Sudbury, A. 1977. ‘The paradox of the unexpected examination.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 55: 41–58.
    • Shaw, R. 1958. ‘The paradox of the unexpected examination.’ Mind, 67: 382–4.
    • Kaplan, D. and Montague, R. 1960. ‘A paradox regained.’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1: 79–90.
    • Harrison, C. 1969. ‘The Unanticipated Examination in view of Kripke's semantics for modal logic.’ In J. W. Davis, D. J. Hockney, and W. K. Wilson (eds.), Philosophical Logic. Dordrecht: Reidel.
    • McLelland, J., and Chihara, C. 1975. ‘The surprise examination paradox.’ Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4: 71–89.
    • Rubinstein, A. 1989. ‘The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge”.’ American Economic Review, 79: 385–91.
    • Bicchieri, C. 1989. ‘Self-refuting theories of strategic interaction: a paradox of common knowledge.’ Erkenntnis, 30: 69–85.
      ——1992. ‘Knowledge-dependent games: backward induction.’ In Bicchieri and Dalla Chiara 1992.
    • Bacharach, M. O. L. 1992a. ‘The acquisition of common knowledge.’ In Bicchieri and Dalla Chiara 1992.
      —— 1992b. ‘Backward induction and beliefs about oneself.’ Synthese, 91: 247–84.
    • Pettit, P. and Sugden, R. 1989. ‘The backward induction paradox.’ Journal of Philosophy, 86: 169–82.
• Some Salient Secondary Readings
  • Quine, W.V.O., 1953, 'On a So-Called Paradox', Mind.
• Week 8: Chapter 7 – Sensitivity
  • Secondary literature cited in main text of chapter 7 (in typographical order)
    • Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • DeRose, K. 1995. ‘Solving the skeptical problem.’ Philosophical Review, 104: 1–52.
      —— 1996. ‘Knowledge, assertion and lotteries.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 568–80.
    • Lewis, D. K. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
    • Sosa, E. 1996. ‘Postscript to “Proper fuctionalism and virtue epistemology”.’ In J. L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
      —— 2000. ‘Contextualism and skepticism.’ In J. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Issues: supp. to Noûs, 34.
    • Dretske, F. I. 1970. ‘Epistemic operators.’ Journal of Philosophy, 67: 1007–23.
    • Luper-Foy, S. 1987. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and his Critics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield.
    • Peacocke, C. A. B. 1986. Thoughts: An Essay on Content. Oxford: Blackwell.
    • Wright, C. J. G. 1983. ‘Keeping track of Nozick.’ Analysis, 43: 134–40.
    • Goldman, A. 1976. ‘Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.’ Journal of Philosophy, 73: 771–91.
    • Luper-Foy, S. 1984. ‘The epistemic predicament: knowledge, Nozickian tracking, and skepticism.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62: 26–48.
    • Shatz, D. 1987. ‘Nozick's conception of skepticism.’ In Luper-Foy 1987.
    • Vogel, J. 1987. ‘Tracking, closure and inductive knowledge.’ In Luper-Foy 1987.
    • Schiffer, S. R. 1996. ‘Contextualist solutions to scepticism.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96: 317–33.
    • Putnam, H. 1981. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Smith, P. 1984. ‘Could we be brains in a vat?’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 14: 115–23.
    • Wright, C. J. G. 1992a. ‘On Putnam's proof that we are not brains-in-a-vat.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 92: 67–94.
  • Some Salient Secondary Readings
    • Pages 123-124 ; page 47 ; Pages 54-57 ; Pages 79-97 (better, all of chapter 3); Pages 68-72 ; Pages 57-59 of Sherri's Tracking Truth
    • L.B. Gunderson, 2004, “Outline of a New Semantics for Counterfactuals”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85: 1–20.
• Week 9: Chapter 8 – Scepticism
  • Secondary literature cited in main text of chapter 8 (in typographical order)
    • Williams, B. A. O. 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry. London: Penguin.
    • Humberstone, I. L. 1988. ‘Some epistemic capacities.’ Dialectica, 42: 183–200.
    • Williamson, T. 1990a. Identity and Discrimination. Oxford: Blackwell.
    • Lewis, D. K. 1996. ‘Elusive knowledge.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 549–67.
    • McDowell, J. H. 1982. ‘Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge.’ Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 455–479. Partly reprinted with revisions in Dancy 1988.
    • Goldman, A. 1976. ‘Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.’ Journal of Philosophy, 73: 771–91.
    • Stine, G. C. 1976. ‘Skepticism, relevant alternatives and deductive closure.’ Philosophical Studies, 29: 249–61.
    • Dretske, F. I. 1981b. ‘The pragmatic dimension of knowledge.’ Philosophical Studies, 40: 363–78.
    • Cohen, S. 1988. ‘How to be a fallibilist.’ Philosophical Perspectives, 2: 91–123.
    • Russell, B. A. W. 1993. Our Knowledge of the External World. London: Routledge. First published 1914.
    • Ayer, A. J. 1940. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. London: Macmillan.
    • Fumerton, R. 2000. ‘Williamson on skepticism and evidence.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60: 629–35.
  • Some Salient Secondary Readings
    • Pages 53-57 of Sherri's Tracking Truth
    • Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson, by Tony Brueckner
    • Review of KAIL by Richard Foley
• Week 10: Chapter 9 – Evidence
  • Secondary literature cited in main text of chapter 9 (in typographical order)
    • Harman, G. 1965. ‘The inference to the best explanation.’ Philosophical Review, 74: 88–95.
    • Lipton, P. J. 1991. Inference to the Best Explanation. London: Routledge.
    • McDowell, 1994. Mind and World. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    • Peacocke, C. A. B. 1992. A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    • Christensen, D. 1992. ‘Confirmational holism and Bayesian epistemology.’ Philosophy of Science, 59: 540–57.
    • Unger, P. 1975. Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Hyman, J. 1999. ‘How knowledge works.’ Philosophical Quarterly, 49: 433–51.
    • Stampe, D. 1987. ‘The authority of desire.’ Philosophical Review, 96: 335–81.
    • Millar, A. 1991. Reasons and Experience. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Maher, P. 1996. ‘Subjective and objective confirmation.’ Philosophy of Science, 63: 149–74.
    • Austin, J. L. 1962. Sense and Sensibilia, ed. G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Some Salient Secondary Readings
    • "Williamson on evidence and knowledge" by Jim Joyce
• Week 11: Chapter 10 – Evidential Probability
  • Secondary literature cited in main text of chapter 10 (in typographical order)
    • Shope, R. K. 1978. ‘The conditional fallacy in modern philosophy.’ Journal of Philosophy, 75: 397–413.
    • Milne, P. M. 1991. ‘A dilemma for subjective Bayesians—and how to resolve it.’ Philosophical Studies, 62: 307–14.
    • Earman, J. 1992. Bayes or Bust? Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    • Kyburg, H., Jr. 1974. The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference. Dordrecht: Reidel.
    • Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Diaconis, P., and Zabell, S. 1982. ‘Updating subjective probability.’ Journal of the American Statistical Association, 77: 822–30.
    • Jeffrey, R. 1975. ‘Carnap's empiricism.’ in G. Maxwell and R. Anderson (eds.), Induction, Probability, and Confirmation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    • Field, H. H. 1978. ‘A note on Jeffrey conditionalization.’ Philosophy of Science, 45: 361–7.
    • Garber, D. 1980. ‘Field and Jeffrey Conditionalization.’ Philosophy of Science, 47: 142–5.
    • Christensen, D. 1992. ‘Confirmational holism and Bayesian epistemology.’ Philosophy of Science, 59: 540–57.
    • Jeffrey, R. 1983. The Logic of Decision, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    • Skyrms, B. 1993. ‘A mistake in dynamic coherence arguments?’ Philosophy of Science, 60: 320–8.
    • Van Fraassen, B. 1984. ‘Belief and the will.’ Journal of Philosophy, 81: 235–56.
    • Talbott, W. J. 1991. ‘Two principles of Bayesian epistemology.’ Philosophical Studies, 62: 135–50.
    • Van Fraassen, B. 1995. ‘Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the sirens.’ Philosophical Studies, 77: 7–37.
    • Skyrms, B. 1987. ‘Dynamic coherence and probability kinematics.’ Philosophy of Science, 54: 1–20.
    • Christensen, D. 1991. ‘Clever bookies and coherent beliefs.’ Philosophical Review, 100: 229–47.
      —— 1996. ‘Dutch-book arguments depragmatized: epistemic consistency for partial believers.’ Journal of Philosophy, 93: 450–79.
    • Green, M., and Hitchcock, C. 1994. ‘Reflections on Reflection: Van Fraassen on belief.’ Synthese, 98: 297–324.
    • Howson, C. 1996. ‘Epistemic probability I.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. 70: 63–77.
    • Castell, P. 1996. ‘Epistemic probability II.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. 70: 79–94.
    • Hild, Matthias. 1997. ‘Induction and the Dynamics of Belief.’ D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University.
    • Levi, I. 1967. ‘Probability kinematics.’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 18: 197–209.
    • Skyrms, B. 1983. ‘Three ways to give a probability assignment a memory.’ In J. Earman (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    • Harman, G. 1986. Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    • Glymour, C. 1980. Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    • Howson, C. and Urbach, P. 1993. Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, 2nd edn. Chicago: Open Court.
    • Maher, P. 1996. ‘Subjective and objective confirmation.’ Philosophy of Science, 63: 149–74.
    • Hintikka, K. J. J. 1962. Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
    • Hughes, G. E., and Cresswell, M. J. 1996. A New Introduction to Modal Logic. London: Routledge.
    • Skyrms, B. 1980. ‘Higher order degrees of belief.’ In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Gaifman, H. 1988. ‘A theory of higher order probabilities.’ In B. Skyrms and W. Harper (eds.), Causation, Chance, and Credence. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    • Humberstone, I. L. 1988. ‘Some epistemic capacities.’ Dialectica, 42: 183–200.
    • Shin, H. S. and Williamson, T. 1994. ‘Representing the knowledge of Turing Machines.’ Theory and Decision, 37: 125–46.
    • Fudenberg, D., and Tirole, J. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    • Aumann, R. 1976. ‘Agreeing to disagree.’ Annals of Statistics, 4: 1236–9.
    • Bacharach, M. O. L. 1985. ‘Some extensions to a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge’. Journal of Economic Theory, 37: 167–90.
    • Geanakoplos, J. 1989. ‘Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus.’ Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 914, Yale University.
      —— 1992. ‘Common knowledge, Bayesean learning and market speculation with bounded rationality.’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6.4: 58–82.
      —— 1994. ‘Common knowledge.’ In R. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory, vol. 2. Leiden: Elsevier.
    • Samet, D. 1990. ‘Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree.’ Journal of Economic Theory, 52: 190–207.
    • Shin, H. S. 1989. ‘Non-partitional information on dynamic state spaces and the possibility of speculation.’ Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory Working Paper 90–11, University of Michigan.
      —— 1992. Review of B. Skyrms, The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Economics and Philosophy, 8: 176–83.
      —— 1993. ‘Logical structure of common knowledge.’ Journal of Economic Theory, 60: 1– 13.
    • Basu, K. 1996. ‘A paradox of knowledge and some related observations.’ Unpublished typescript.
    • Williamson, T. 1994b. Vagueness. London: Routledge.
    • Goldstein, M. 1983. ‘The prevision of a prevision’. Journal of the American Statistical Association 78: 817–19.
  • Some Salient Secondary Readings
    • "Unlearning what you've learned", Mike Titelbaum
    • "The concept of inductive probability", Patrick Maher
• Week 12: Chapter 11 – Assertion
  • Secondary literature cited in main text of chapter 11 (in typographical order)
    • Lewis, D. K. 1975. ‘Languages and language.’ in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    • Dummett, M. A. E. 1991. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. London: Duckworth.
    • Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    • Dewey, J. 1938. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt.
    • Gazdar, G. 1979. Pramatics: Implicature, Presupposition, and Logical Form. New York: Academic Press.
    • Slote, M. A. 1979. ‘Assertion and belief.’ In J. Dancy (ed.), Papers on Language and Logic.
    • Dudman, V. 1992. ‘Probability and assertion.’ Analysis, 52: 204–11.
    • Lowe, E. J. 1995. ‘The truth about counterfactuals.’ Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 41–59.
    • Edgington, D. 1995. ‘On conditionals.’ Mind, 104: 235–329.
    • DeRose, K. 1996. ‘Knowledge, assertion and lotteries.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 568–80.
    • Unger, P. 1975. Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Armstrong, D. M. 1973. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • BonJour, L. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    • Harman, G. 1968. ‘Knowledge, inference and explanation.’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 5: 164–73.
    • Dretske, F. I. 1981b. ‘The pragmatic dimension of knowledge.’ Philosophical Studies, 40: 363–78.
    • Craig, E. J. 1990a. Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Lewis, D. K. 1996. ‘Elusive knowledge.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 549–67.
    • DeRose, K. 1991. ‘Epistemic possibilities.’ Philosophical Review, 100: 581–605.
    • Black, M. 1952. ‘Saying and disbelieving.’ Analysis, 13: 25–33.
    • Moore, G. E. 1912. Ethics. London: Thornton Butterworth.
      —— 1962. Commonplace Book: 1919–1953. London: Allen & Unwin.
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  • Some Salient Secondary Readings
    • "Must We Know What We Say?", by Matt Weiner

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